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It is our hope, of course, that such a book as Klinck's will ultimately be made 
redundant for the study of Maritime literature by the progress of scholarship in 
the field. But the very real weaknesses of Literary History of Canada are not 
things for which individual essayists or the editor are entirely to blame; a better 
general history of Maritime literature cannot be produced by any method what-
ever until the specific history has been fully researched, and this is a process 
which is only beginning. 
The prospect has already been seized upon by some, and important works 
are going forward; there are unlimited literary undertakings lying at our 
feet ready to be done . . . . It is time to expand literary studies to embrace 
history, politics, sociology and science and other ways of looking — at this 
place, this past, this ever-present." 
The 1976 Literary Colloquium at Saint John was a valuable stimulous to 
literary research in Atlantic Canada. It is time for another. Literary scholars in 
the Maritimes have finally realized that they do not have to justify local research 
as an academically respectable pursuit. It is a simple matter of "getting our 
bearings", as Northrop Fry would say. The new generation of teachers and 
researchers at our Maritime Universities would do well to cultivate a healthy 
disregard for a literary establishment which fails to recognize the social and 
historical significance of Charles Bruce or Frank Parker Day. 
ANDREW T. SEAMAN 
Canada's Economic Problems and 
the American Connection 
In recent years there has been a growing body of literature critical of 
Canada's economic performance. Critics of what may be described as 'the 
Canadian-Syndrome'complain that Canada-has-concentrated-fartoo-large-su 
portion of its employed labour force in low value adding activity, has allowed 
external interests to control a large part of the economy and to dominate critical 
processes essential to development, has failed to develop or attract sufficient 
indigenous entrepreneurship and innovative capacity, and lacks the necessary 
homogeneity and co-operating skills and the ability to identify and deal 
effectively with economic realities. Some Canadians may take offense at this 
list, but it is undeniable that Canada is developing at a rate far below its 
potential, that the economy increasingly relies on initiative, technical expertise, 
capital and advanced products of external origins, and that the nation has 
adopted living standards matched neither by productivity levels, nor by over-all 
4 Lochhead, op. cit., p. 8. 
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developmental achievement. This review article focusses on five very different 
publications which deal with aspects of these problems and with the closely 
interrelated question of Canadian-American economic relations. 
Three of these publications deal with the complicated and very technical 
subject of the impact of the Canadian tariff. D.J. Daley and S. Globerman's 
Tariffand Science Policies: Applications of a Model of a Nationalism (Toronto, 
Ontario Economic Council Research Series, 1976), R. Dauphin's The Impact 
of Free Trade in Canada (Ottawa, Economic Council of Canada, 1978), and 
James R. Williams' The Canadian-United States Tariff and Canadian 
Industry: A Multisectoral Analysis (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1978), are written by economists. None of them constitute historical probes. All 
three concentrate on recent periods, using jargon and theories aimed primarily 
at a professional audience. Paying some attention to Canada's highly differen-
tiated regional economies, the three studies attempt to capture the effects of the 
tariff structure upon a disaggregated economy. Williams concludes that the 
Canadian economy would not only expand under free trade, but that there 
would also be a shift toward more advanced manufacturing. To some extent 
Dauphin's findings are in conflict with Williams', since he concludes that there 
will be a shift in favour of resource processing under unilateral free trade. But 
Dauphin accepts that tariff removal would stimulate a move toward greater 
efficiency. Daley and Globerman show that the tariff has reduced and slowed the 
diffusion of new processes and new techniques into Canada. This observation is 
especially important in view of the fact that advanced industrial countries today 
compete largely on the basis of quality and technological sophistication, while 
price competition plays subordinate role. The constraints imposed by tariff 
barriers on an economy appear to be quite situation specific, in terms of their 
social costs and developmental effects. There can be little doubt that tariffs in 
practice can serve as a subsidy to a host of relatively inefficient, non-innovative 
foreign owned branch plants producing unnecessarily expensive commodities of 
unnecessarily low quality for captive domestic markets. Indeed, trade barriers 
may very well serve external interests. Canada is not exactly walled in by tariff 
barriers. As much as 53% of the value of all manufactured goods imported in 
1970 entered Canada free of duty, as opposed to 6% for the U.S. Since these 
levels have remained quite steady recently, non-tariff barriers are in this 
reviewer's opinion quite powerful, although these authors appear to think 
otherwise. 
Williams and, to a lesser degree, Dauphin rely quite heavily on formal 
theoretical presentations in the neoclassical tradition to prove their case. While 
non-economists may quite easily be taken in by all the jargon and formalism, as 
well as by the overly enthusiastic claims made by book jacket writers, there is a 
need for healthy scepticism. The authors have attempted to analyse very 
complicated processes and issues using methodologies designed for fictitious 
domains where a wide variety of disturbing forces are conventiently absent. 
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None of the authors deny that narrow restrictive assumptions have been 
imposed. Williams has even taken pains to outline his underlying assumptions, 
although only to conclude later that the effects of imposed restrictions and 
specification errors are so mild that one can conclude the findings apply 
unmodified to the real world. This reviewer does not agree. It is not safe to draw 
on partial and general equilibrium analysis in settings riddled with imperfections, 
undergoing significant structural change, and represented by data of 
questionable quality. Both Williams and Dauphin rely heavily upon the well 
known Leontief Input-Output analysis. In the I-O model, the economy is 
subdivided into a number of artificial homogeneous sectors. Intermediate goods 
flow from sector to sector, to become final goods in the end. These flows are 
inserted into a so-called transaction table, which can be viewed as a snapshot of 
the economy's technology. It is obviously possible to form an identity for each 
sector which equates its output to the sum of intermediate and final products 
which it produces. Taking all identified sectors simultaneously, a system of 
equations emerges. 
But there are problems in applying the I-O model. Both Williams and 
Dauphin appear convinced that 1961 (or 1965) I-O 'snapshots' remain relevant 
for many years and that the I-O model is capable of predicting marked 
structural change. In fact, most I-O information is obsolete two or three years 
after compilation, as forecasting experiments indicate very clearly. Moreover, 
the I-O model is based on strictly fixed production coefficients. As there are 
constant relative proportions, the 'pictured' economy varies only in size, while 
real development (growth and change) cannot be accommodated. Numerous 
other restrictive assumptions are imposed on the analysis: constant returns to 
scale, instantaneous adjustment, linearity throughout, perfect market structures 
and perfect information, prices convey all the required information. These 
assumptions, and others not mentioned, are most convenient, but they are far 
from realistic. Statisticians responsible for I-O data set construction are usually 
not a happy lot; readers who take time off and study the manuals on the subject 
wiU-soon-under-st-and-w 
unobservable variables; they are often addicted to super-simplicity (who has not 
heard about 'the Ricardian Vice'); they even have the courage to add the 
so-called 'competitive imports' (i.e. imported commodities which can be 
produced domestically) to domestic production. All this creates problems for 
model users, who conveniently tend to forget about imposed peculiarities. 
As an extension to the I-O analysis, Williams uses a linear programming 
model. Linear programming derives optimal solutions to objective functions, 
constrained by equality and inequality restrictions, such as resource limitations, 
minimal feasible scale, etc. The suggested objective function constitutes the 
most disturbing feature. Here Williams states that the aim is to maximize 
domestic production of consumer goods. There is no logical reason why this 
'optimal' solution should even come close to a solution path compatible with 
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comparative advantages. The critical needs for specialization, economies of 
scale, economies of agglomeration (critical mix), etc., are all ignored. For 
example, why not maximize net social returns instead, using a suitable optimal 
control theory model? 
The neoclassical general and partial equilibrium analysis model, which all 
three publications use, keeps appearing in spite of a considerable body of 
literature focussing on disequilibrium, and on phenomena belonging to the 
realm called 'real economics' by Janos Kornai (as opposed to 'pure economies' 
which is considered an esoteric exercise in pure logic). There is in fact nothing 
terribly attractive about the pursuit of fuzzy equilibria, which are unlikely to be 
desirable by the time they can be reached (if this is at all possible). In the real 
world, economic adjustments are bulky; and aspirations and external conditions 
change as the economy evolves. A variety of powerful institutional forces are 
often dominant variables. Since none of this is taken into account by EQ 
models, there is no reason to expect that EQ based deductions and 
extrapolations have any real world relevance. There is no reason to expect that 
even 'second-best solutions' will emerge from the analysis. Daley and 
Globerman provide the least esoteric product among the three books under 
consideration. At least they have reduced the level of misspecification by 
including the important technology variable. This inclusion is highly relevant in 
the Canadian case, given slow adoption of technological change, given very low 
levels of innovation, and given recent Science Council recommendations which 
seem to suggest that the use of foreign technology should be restricted in 
Canada. This research effort could, however, have gone much deeper. 
In fact, if one is going to understand the reasons for Canada's poor economic 
performance, institutional issues are critical. Both Wallace Clement's 
Continental Corporate Power: Economic Elite Linkages (Toronto, 
McClelland and Stewart, 1977) and John Hutcheson's Dominance and 
Dependency: Liberalism and National Policy in the North American Triangle 
(Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1978) grapple to some extent with these 
issues. Although Clement and Hutcheson also concentrate on the contemporary 
scene and their historical coverage is quite light, they have an advantage over the 
authors encountered above. They did not have to force their studies into 
theoretical straight jackets to maintain academic respectability. Hutcheson 
unfortunately falls for the temptation anyway, relying fairly heavily on Harold 
Innis' so-called 'staples theory'. This is a mistake. The staples approach merely 
describes a passive development sequence responding to exogenous forces. 
There is nothing of substance in this approach regarding the general 
developmental process and no real causality is built into the staples argument. 
There is no explanation, for example, why internally positioned human factors 
remained passive in Canada, while they become highly active and creative in 
countries like Switzerland, Japan, and Finland. The latter nations seem to have 
responded in part to the very absence of rich resource bases, developing 
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advanced software, as well as products and services in demand, while Canada 
'fell asleep', thinking heavy resource rent-taking would protect the nation's 
income position for all time. Both Finland and Switzerland are multicultural 
societies. Finland was even treated as a colony up to 1917, and the country still 
leads a precarious existence next to its super power neighbour, the Soviet Union. 
In fact, a considerable number of countries which have been relatively successful 
in the development field share borders with powerful dominating societies. 
There is then nothing very unique about Canada's situation, if one considers 
its basic environment. The chain of fundamental forces and processes which 
generated contemporary Canada are not just lying at the surface for all to see. 
Neither Clement, nor Hutcheson provides any deep insights into evolution 
basics, into feasible alternatives, or into causal relationships among the 
variables which the authors mention. The reader is simply confronted with a 
great many sweeping generalizations and a great deal of rigid categorization. 
Clement utilizes the categorization device so widely that one cannot help but 
feel that the corporate elites are 'found guilty' merely on the basis of 
'circumstantial evidence'. Of course, a considerable portion of the literature, 
dealing with our topic, tends to take the easy way out. There are exceptions such 
as a now dated book, written by Penrose.1 But it is high time that someone 
developed in depth action and reaction profiles, 'relating' Canada-United 
States corporate elites, political spheres, and financial elites, to economic 
performance and development. We know very little about how the command, 
and influence structures function, and we know all too little about these 
structures' short-run and longer-run objectives. The incentives which led 
Canadians to opt for 'subordinated continentalism' have not been clearly 
examined. Reading these books the reader will not be significantly wiser, 
therefore, regarding the pressing questions. Why did Canada — a former 
colony — exchange the U.K. apronstrings for those of the U.S.? Why did 
Canada fail to push for a fair common market arrangement on the North 
American Continent, and develop fully as an economy? Why such passivity, 
"when all could"bFn^fir^irfuiltaTïëuïïsly? 
Both Clement and Hutcheson acknowledge that 'the Americanization' of 
Canada's economy became visible rather recently, but they do not give 
sufficient attention to the processes which led to this development. It would not 
have been too difficult to collect information on what happened to Canadian 
industry's innovative and entrepreneurial abilities right after World War II. At 
that time, all the critical embryos essential for advanced industrialization were 
in place. The world markets were hungry for products, and even able to supply 
additional entrepreneurship and patents, as well as labour on Canadian shores. 
The Canadian economy chose to become an American branch plant instead of 
opting for the far more rewarding and independent route, which no doubt would 
1 E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (London, 1959). 
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have led to formation of a dynamic continental common market. The 
Canadians' contribution to their own 'development' became a poorly focussed, 
and over-extended infrastructure, and a great number of care takers responding 
to demands and commands issued from externally located prime decision 
centres. One cannot really blame the foreign exploiters for accepting an open 
invitation. And it is not sufficient to seek the causes through classification of 
highly visible individuals (who may in fact have had a trivial impact on events), 
or by noting that high officials were born Americans and that leading public 
servants subsequently became highly placed in the international elite hierarchy, 
after terminating their public duties. The authors should have probed far deeper, 
and far wider. Most of the probing would almost certainly have pointed to 
complex causes far closer to home. All in all, Clement provides a book not very 
different from his earlier work, The Canadian Corporate Elite: an analysis of 
economic power (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975). And Hutcheson 
takes his cue from the heated debates over the Canadian identity which have 
taken place in the last decade. While both books may serve perfectly as late 
evening reading, they do not represent milestones in the search for fundamental 
knowledge about the topic considered central to this review. 
The authors and their publishers may very well find this review too harsh. Yet 
there is a dire need for profound and in-depth analysis of the underlying causes 
of Canada's economic problems. This is not the time, if there ever was such a 
time, to aim for academic respectability, or to regurgitate conventional 
wisdoms. Perhaps some enterprising publishing house can discover a young, 
open-eyed, and non-pretentious 'Gunnar Myrdal', and ask him (or her) to write 
"The Canadian Dilemma" and "The Canadian Drama". This reviewer 
suspects that neither the elites, nor lack of opportunities, nor trade barriers will 
be singled out as key problems by this unknown writer. Our writer is more likely 
to label massive conflicts and inadequacies in regard to collective attitudes, 
capabilities, and aspirations as problem number one, and to point accusingly at 
institutional bottlenecks and weaknesses. Our writer will probably conclude that 
elites, trade legislation, R & D policies are generally quite capable of rising to 
the occasion, as long as the fundamental development climate is reasonably 
favourable. 
H.K. LARSEN 
